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China and India in the year 2020 – Transatlantic vision
of two emerging powers
European and US approaches towards China have increasingly attracted the 
interest of an expert community on both sides of the Atlantic. Embedded in the
field of security or economics, the question how the West should deal with the
rising power of China is one of the most challenging topics. China’s development
has tremendous regional as well as global implications.
But it is not just China that matters. The role of India as an emerging world power
is of great importance as well. Realizing how different the developments of China
and India are and considering the long conflictual relationship between these
Asian powers, it should not be neglected, that a new form of cooperative rela-
tionship is currently developing between them. Both, the EU and the United States
are and will be affected by the way China and India continue to forge ahead in the
near future. But, so far, we look at China and India rarely in a "combined" per-
spective. Regarding the noteworthy race between China and India, it is commend-
able to take a closer look at the economic and political development of both emer-
ging powers within the next decades and the role of the transatlantic partners 
within the reshaping of international relations.
Various statistics show that China and India will be the fastest growing markets for
the next 15 years, leaving Russia and Brazil behind. Important criteria for this
development are the growth of the population (approximately 1.5 billion each in
2025), investment in human capital and the opening of their economies. In terms
of democracy, environment and open economic markets India seems to be in a
better position to handle the enormous challenges related herewith. Despite their
Growing Markets
With the emergence of China and India the focus of international politics is shifting
more and more to Asia. American and European experts therefore discussed in a two-
day conference at the Center for Applied Policy Research (C·A·P) the ‘Chindia Connec-
tion’ and the implications for the transatlantic partnership. The 14th Transatlantic
Roundtable of the Improving Responsiveness Program, dealing with this important
topic, was organized in cooperation with the U.S. Consulate General in Munich. The 25
Participants analysed various security and economy related aspects concerning the
current approach of the United States and the European Union towards China and
India and the increasing cooperation between both emerging powers. The Center for
Applied Policy Research would like to thank the German Marshall Fund of the United
States for enabling this conference by the generous support of the Transatlantic
Roundtable Program as part of a Key Institution Grant to the C·A·P.
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great performance both will stay ‘emerging’markets even beyond 2020. The conse-
quences for the world economy are an increasing demand for commodities just as
extension of provision of goods and services. China and India, the Growth Stars
arise from developing countries to new investment destinations and needless to
say to new investors abroad.
Close to the economic development, the question of cooperation or competition of
India and China seems not to be answered in near future. Economic growth can be
a chance for both countries to take advantage of the new national and internation-
al changes. A win-win-situation would be the best aim for India and China, of
course when they try to generate a close partnership. Anyway, attaining this goal
was not appearing on the agenda neither of India nor of China. Both states are
fraught with interior problems and both states have an insecure international sta-
tus, which needs to be appointed, especially by the United States, the United
Nations and last but not least the European Union.
On the other hand, the economic growth also demands more natural resources for
the production of energy. India and China strongly depend on the import of oil and
natural gas, especially from the Middle East region. Apart from the environmental
implications this dependency may also lead to some form of energy nationalism.
Current attempts of signing cooperation deals with less reputable states can be
seen as one indicator for this development.
From an economic point of view there will be a different impact on the transatlan-
tic partnership and the world economy. Not every actor will benefit from the
increasing importance of China and India. Related herewith, indirect consequen-
ces need to be considered such as the dominating role of Chinese textile exports
which leads to a decline of textile industries in other countries e.g. in North Africa.
It is also pointed out that the integration of China and India into the global secu-
rity architecture will be a major challenge for the United States and Europe.
Looking at the continuous double-digit growth of the Chinese defence budget
since 1990 the modernization efforts could be seen as a major strategic challenge
in Asia, especially for the United States. But compared to the overall economic
development, China and India are currently spending only between 2.3-2.8% of
their GDP on the military. Nevertheless, it seems questionable whether China
could become the regions’ stakeholder in the field of defence. In a transatlantic
context, the key issues discussed are the different perceptions of the United States
and Europe towards the growing Chinese defence budget, the role of Japan as a
counter balance, the relationship between China and Russia, the engagement of
China in Africa, and a possible competition between a solid partnership of China
and India on the one hand and the EU and U.S. on the other hand.
India or China – who will dominate in the future?
Although the world hasn’t realized yet, the result of the battle between India and
China will replace the existing rules in international relations. The big question for
the world community is: which of the two will come off as winner? The following
comparison should help making a prophecy about the potential development of
India and China on their way to assume power.
Resources
Security and Defence
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China and India have both an exorbitant interest on education, but India is pro-
ducing more young and better-qualified professionals. By 2008, India’s total pool
of qualified graduates will be more than twice as large as China’s.
While India is becoming more and more world’s number one in the medical area,
especially in cardiology, China seems to neglect even its own population. Only
20% of Ministry of Health financing are spend on rural areas, where 70% of the
population is resident. The public health spending is shrinking ratio of GDP.
Nevertheless AIDS is an enormous subject matter in both countries. India is mis-
managing its AIDS crisis. It has more HIV cases than any other country in the
world. China in contrast is covering up its situation about HIV-infected person.
Facing the risk of an Africa-style AIDS crisis that could decimate its population and
economy, the Chinese government acts irresponsibly.
India has a solid financial system, while China’s banking system is collapsing.
Since the gradually opening of the Chinese banking sector, there is a chance to
rekindle the solidified system of regulation, which prevented the investment and
closely work of foreign banks with the Chinese credit institutions.
By 2025, China’s population will be only 90 million more than India. However
India has better demographic premises for future growth, because China’s popu-
lation will suffer from rapid aging (Population % > 65 = China: 13,4; India: 8,4).
Half of India’s population is nowadays under 25 years old.
Free press, Civil Society and political stability are the potential of India’s democra-
cy. China bears more uncertainty, concluding mass unrest or even a civil war.
India is not an expert in economic policy-making. Referring to the complicated
Indian political system, the economy decision making of China seems to be more
shrewd, pro-growth and farsighted. The consequence is a new prosperity to mil-
lions of China’s citizens. Its population is presently nearly twice as rich as India’s.
Remarking the weak middle class in India and the great amount of the population
living in rural poverty, it will depend on how India is going to take the plunge from
an agricultural economy to a service economy, without an industrial revolution in-
between.
Despite all barriers erected by China’s government, the administration is more
incomplex than in India, where ramified laws aggravate the daily trade flow. India’s
bureaucracy has created thousands of controls and resulted in blockading the day-
to-day business. The new appraisal system for the top bureaucracy has not done
much to improve the situation.
China has been perfectionist in upgrading its infrastructure, while India lost sight
of this basic challenge. This could be a regression in the Indian rise. Its third-rate
roads and ports mar its economic future.
Five of world’s ten most polluted cities are in China. Furthermore 70% of the water
is polluted, 30 % unusable for any purpose. China’s environmental problem be-
comes more and more a big domestic deal, especially the rising energy consump-
tion associated with wilful environmental neglect.
Education
Medical Care
Financial System
Demographic Growth
Democracy
Economic Policy-Making
Administration
Infrastructure
Environment
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India and China – cooperation or competition? 
The possible scenario for 2020 concerning the cooperation between India and
China could reach loose cooperation in the field of peacekeeping up to closer eco-
nomic relationship. The India-China two-way trade is now US $ 1 billon a month,
compared to US $ 1 billion a year one decade ago. India is a potential economic
partner for China, while China’s value is being a possible ally in espousing some
developmental issues in the World Trade Organization. Economic cooperation bet-
ween China and India began in earnest in the year 2000, a few years under age to
enable a prognosis about it.
Another prophecy anticipates that China will neglect India and build rapport in
the range of competition. The current volume of China-India trade ($ 12 billion) is
still of modest proportions by world standards, because competition between the
two countries is considered inevitable, despite the fact that neither India nor China
would like to give a competitive edge to each other, especially in the hard-fought
software sector.
The question is whether the competition remains to be purely economical or if
China is military challenged by India. Hereby the relationship between these two
countries is running the risk of attaining the status of the relationship between
China and Japan. But there was also agreement about defence cooperation, even
though China’s suspicions about India’s intentions in its neighbourhood. After all
China still has a strong relationship with Pakistan. About 80% of Pakistan’s Armed
Forces are equipped with Chinese defence goods. 60% of its military aircrafts come
from China. But domestic disturbances in China could lead to instability and even
state failure within the region, which would prevent China from external adven-
tures and soften their military ambitions. A useful and equal partner is valued in
uncertain times. China is aware of that fact.
The role of India in Washington’s foreign and security policy
After three decades of isolation the relationship between the United States and
India seems to transform into a new form of strategic partnership. Washington has
practical economic, political, energy, and strategic interests to enhance better rela-
tions to a country, which personates moreover the most numerous minority group
in the U.S. with a strong lobby. Noteworthy appears the foreign policy of the Bush-
administration as well as the debate concerning the civil nuclear cooperation deal
between both countries, which de facto recognizes India as nuclear weapon state,
even though it has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
The U.S.-India deal fits not only in security precautions of the U.S., it is also part
of the new environmental and energy strategy, whereby the U.S. accepts that they
have a big dependency on oil from instable states. Hence they try to avoid fossil
fuels and to turn toward alternative energy sources like hydrogen technologies and
above all nuclear power. Because this is not only a U.S. problem (nuclear power
seems to be a proper solution for many other States as well), they are choosing the
line of least resistance. The U.S.-India deal could be the first move in a new global
appreciation of nuclear power and connected with this challenge the first move to
control this preciousness.
Rising trade-numbers
Security Relations
Nuclear Technology Deal
New Strategic Partnership
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Besides the positive effects of this strategic approach there are several risks at-
tached to this deal. First, other countries like Pakistan, North Korea, or Iran could
reconsider their self-restrained position and feel encouraged to intensify their
military nuclear program. Pakistan could adopt the U.S.-India agreement for an
according model with China. Second, international efforts to control the spread of
nuclear arms could in general be seriously damaged. The deal still has to be con-
firmed by U.S. Congress, which seems possible, if India accepts special conditions
concerning the cooperation with the U.S. and the International Atomic Energy
Agency.
In this context it is pointed out, that the way how the U.S. and India prepared the
agreement – consulting only some EU member states – was not helpful for the
transatlantic partnership. Doubts were also raised whether India could be taken for
granted. An emerging India, which is referred to as a strategic partner for the
United States, could become an ambitious political power in the region, unpre-
pared to act in a reasonable and responsible way. Moreover, it was a point of inte-
rest, whether the U.S. are cooperating with and supporting India because they
represent the same value for democracy – in contrast to China. This could be seen
as a wider process of a U.S.-’democracy-promotion-strategy’.
According to the point, the U.S. are actually trying to implement the deal with
India as a part of the democracy promotion strategy, it unsheathes once again the
dilemma of the transatlantic partnership. Europeans are not only but primarily
interested in economic advantages, while the U.S. bear in mind their national in-
terest when dealing with India. The intention of democracy promotion is in this
case to enforce India to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and thereby to
assume international responsibility.
Nevertheless, the democracy promotion strategy has also perfidies. It is not a neutral
tool and changes always the balance of power. Furthermore the U.S. could be faced
with new problems when the democracy promotion works. The rise of strong 
states could produce new competitors to the U.S. and thus a situation the U.S has
never been faced with. Also the continuous problem of differentiation of civilian
and military utilization of nuclear power fortify the tense situation. In spite of these
presumptions, the U.S.-India deal shows promise that this intention to collaborate
could overlap the possible collective action problems produced in a multi actors
game with multiple goals and make a hardly dirigible situation controllable.
EU-China cooperation – what’s in it for Europe?
The European Union does not refer to China as a direct military threat, but rather
as a major economic partner. Economy is currently the main field of cooperation.
China is the second most important trading partner for the EU and China refers to
Europe as its most important trading partner (with Germany as the strongest
European trading partner followed by France). Nevertheless Europe needs to bear
in mind that with the still open Taiwan question and strained China-Japan rela-
tions, there are unresolved security tensions within the region endangering stabil-
ity. Growing nationalism within China might increase this danger.
It is also laid out that there is a big structural difference in Europe’s approach
towards China, compared to the China policy of the United States. The multiface-
Regional Power India
India as rival
Economic Partnership
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ted nature of Europe’s policy-making leads to varying competences in the involved
policy fields, to a variety of actors, and to different perceptions within the member
states. Because of the disparity within the EU, Europeans concentrate more on
institutions and sometimes get the allegation to focus rather on the debate than on
the implementation of political action. But even though the EU cannot be seen as
a single actor, it is an important global player. With publishing an EU-strategy-
paper, China has shown that it takes Europe for granted. This was a common sign
for emphasizing the importance of Europe for China.
However, recently there were few differences between Europe and China, which
should be smoothed out in the near future. Especially the states in southern
Europe, that have strong links with the textile industry in North Africa, compete
with the Chinese textile industry, which grows larger every day. This situation
results in extended anti-dumping measures made by the involved states. But pro-
tectionism is a step, which China is expecting the European Union to neglect. It is
roughly the same situation concerning the arms embargo. The Chinese therefore
reacted cold when the EU decided not to lift it in the near future.
In contrast to the United States, trade and economic relations determine the EU’s
perception of China. In terms of security policy Europe still faces problems to de-
fine its global security interests. While the United States proclaims their concerns
in a very open manner, security in the Asia-Pacific region is still limited to an expert
debate in Europe. If both transatlantic partners think about elaborating a common
agenda, the EU and the U.S. have to consider how to deal with the dilemma of
sharing responsibilities as allies in the terms of security policy while being eco-
nomic competitors at the same time.
Especially the U.S.-India-deal should make the Europeans think about their role
in the world’s new energy situation. If nuclear power will be the next big deal,
Europe should define its position besides the different national interests and atti-
tudes. Germany in this point can be referred to as a special demeanour. The former
coalition of Social democrats and the Green Party with Chancellor Gerhard
Schroeder was resolved to back out of the nuclear energy program. Despite a new
administration since autumn 2005, the current coalition has shown steady resis-
tance to withdraw from that decision. But the German minister for economic
affairs, Michael Glos, put this position into question when he said that nearly all
developed nations have understood that nuclear power is essential for a save sup-
ply with energy and for achieving the climate protection goals. His final thought is
simple: Why should Germany not come to this conclusion and use nuclear power
peacefully? The answer on this question will also have effects on the European
approach towards the current nuclear energy debate and its attempts to influence
ambitions and decisions of third countries like India or China concerning their
energy security.
The CHINDIA-Connection as touchstone for the future Transatlantic Partnership
Concluding the consequences of the emergence of China and India for the trans-
atlantic partnership, for the United States this topic is part of a broader context
dealing with the rise of Asia, leading to principal challenges:
– Will the region produce a peer competitor to the United States?
– Will the region’s weaknesses produce threats to U.S. security?
Varying Competences
Textile Industry
Security Policy
Energy Security
C·A·P Aktuell · 6 · 2006 Seite 7
Bauer · The CHINDIA-Connection
– Will the region’s behaviour produce collective action problems that undermine
U.S. security?
– Will the region produce new partners that can collaborate in the attainment of
common goals?
Europe’s strategic deficit is clearly a great disadvantage for the transatlantic part-
nership, making it almost impossible to find a common approach towards China
and India. The main issue remains to be the impact of globalization on the inter-
national struggle for power. The central dilemma in this struggle is that the process
of economic interdependence that conduces to the mutual prosperity of the West
also leads to the creation of capacities and capabilities that aggravates strategic
competition. But nevertheless Washington is also counting on the pacifying effects
of economic interdependence and democracy. Problems between the United States
and the EU occur because of the different, if not even diverging, perceptions on the
two emerging powers.
For Europe, it is considered best to abandon the arrogance of the weak and try to
regain new strength, while at the same time it should overcome the incoherence of
the interests of its main actors and finally define itself as an international actor,
who deserves to be taken seriously.
The U.S. instead still seems to be divided on China Policy. No consensus exists on
the question whether the U.S. should cooperate with China to help maintain peace
and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in Asia. A study from The Pew Research
Center for The People and The Press acknowledges that 45% of the public choose
cooperation while 44% opt for a firm stand. The problem is that the Americans not
really believe in Chinas change to democratic standards. Less than one-quarter
(23%) of Americans say that China is becoming more democratic, 65% feel just the
opposite is true. Another study confirms these outcomes. Only a small minority
(14%) still see China as an adversary, four-in-ten regard China to be a serious
problem but not an adversary and 36% of Americans don’t care about Chinas
imminence. As the American population, the U.S. Government still seems not to
have established future intentions in their relationship with China. One can say,
that U.S.-China policy since the election of George W. Bush as President of the
United States has run through four phases: half-hearted confrontation, half-hear-
ted cooperation, disregard and imminent loss of navigation.
China needs more observance by the UN. India needs to take a more privilege
position in the European world outlook. Both, China and India are today more wil-
ling to try their luck through international cooperation based on the membership
in the United Nations. Before the U.S.-India deal, India strengthened its opinion
about the United Nations having a future role especially in elimination of the 
threat arising from the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Multilaterally
negotiated, universal and non-discriminatory disarmament instruments should be
proved by the side of the United Nations helping to stop the proliferation of nuc-
lear weapons. Needless to say that India has in mind becoming a permanent 
member of the Security Council one day.
The transatlantic partners Europe and USA have currently in common that their
approach is a balancing act based on the hope that globalization, democratization
and the need for ongoing economic development in both, China and India, will
help to settle potential security dilemmas. What neither Europe nor USA should
Europe’s strategic deficit
U.S. scepticism
United Nations
Balancing Act
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lose sight of is the classification of China and India in the new world order. The
transatlantic partners interest has been sparked in these two countries. A plan is
needed how to arrange with the new situation. And finally, this arrangement will
depend on what the new situation might be: a chance for abolishing new security
hot spots or a threat on the part of two countries, which perhaps simply haven’t
been aware of their true potential to this day.
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